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Perhaps the most striking feature of  "crowdfunding" is the broad geographic dispersion of investors
in small, early-stage projects.  This contrasts with existing theories that predict entrepreneurs and investors
will be co-located due to distance-sensitive costs. We examine a crowdfunding setting that connects
artist-entrepreneurs with investors over the internet for financing musical projects. The average distance
between artists and investors is about 3,000 miles, suggesting a reduced role for spatial proximity.
Still, distance does play a role.  Within a single round of financing, local investors invest relatively
early, and they appear less responsive to decisions by other investors. We show this geography effect
is driven by investors who likely have a personal connection with the artist-entrepreneur ("family and
friends"). Although the online platform seems to eliminate most distance-related economic frictions
such as monitoring progress, providing input, and gathering information, it does not eliminate social-related
frictions.
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Perhaps the most striking characteristic of crowdfunding is the geographic dispersion of in-
vestors. For example, in our data from a crowdfunding website that facilitates investments in
early-stage musicians seeking nancing, we nd a mean distance between artist-entrepreneur
and investor of approximately 3,000 miles.
Although distant investors are common for publicly traded companies, theory predicts
that investors in early stage entrepreneurial ventures will tend to be local. That is because
gathering information, monitoring progress, and providing input are particularly important
for investors in early stage ventures and the costs of these activities are sensitive to distance.
Most empirical evidence to date supports these claims (Tribus 1970, Florida and Kenney
1988, Florida and Smith 1993, Lerner 1995, Sorenson and Stuart 2001, Powell, Koput, Bowie,
and Smith-Doerr 2002, Zook 2002, Mason 2007).
Specically, Sorenson and Stuart (2005) report that the average distance between lead
VC and target rm is approximately 70 miles. Similarly, Sohl (1999) and Wong (2002) report
that angel investors locate close to the entrepreneurs they nance (more than 50% are within
half a day of travel).
The geographic dispersion of investment evident in our data implies that crowdfunding
in our setting largely overcomes the distance-related economic frictions usually associated
with nancing entrepreneurial ventures. That is not because the artist-entrepreneurs seeking
nancing on this site are not early stage. To the contrary, they are unsigned artists seeking
capital to record their rst album. Most are young, have limited reputations as artists or
entrepreneurs, and appear to have minimal resources.
Instead, it appears that the online platform provides an environment purposely designed
for early stage entrepreneurs where they can showcase prototypes of their music, present a
business plan outlining how they will spend their funds, and directly pitch their project to a
1community of online investors. In this way, and consistent with prior research in retail and
advertising that examines how the online setting allows people to overcome oine barriers
to market transactions (Choi and Bell 2010, Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman 2009, Goldfarb
and Tucker 2010), the platform can help reduce market frictions associated with geographic
distance.
Although the role of geography appears to be greatly diminished in our data when we
consider aggregate investment at the end of the funding process, an important distinction
between local and distant investors comes into sharp relief when we examine investment
patterns over time within a single round of nancing. We employ a dierence-in-dierence-
like approach to compare rst the dierence between local and distant investors in terms of
their propensity to invest in a given period and then how this dierence changes with the
publicly visible investment decisions of others. We nd that the timing of distant, but not
local, investments is very responsive to the investment decisions of others.
Why might local investors dier so greatly from distant investors in their responsiveness
to the investment decisions of others? The entrepreneurial nance literature makes frequent
reference to the role of family and friends (F&F) as an important source of capital for
early stage ventures.1 Parker (2009) reports that 31% of start-ups' funds come from family
and friends. Researchers have emphasized family and friends' informational advantages
concerning the quality of the entrepreneur. For example, Cumming and Johan (2009) assert
that \Apart from the founding entrepreneur's savings, family and friends [...] are a common
source of capital for earliest-stage entrepreneurial rms. An entrepreneur without a track
record typically has an easier time raising this type of capital because these investors will
have known the entrepreneur for a long time. In other words, information asymmetries faced
1Despite the acknowledged importance of F&F, there are surprisingly few empirical studies focussed on
this form of investment, likely owing to a paucity of data. However, as Cumming and Johan (2009) note,
\Recent eorts spurred by the Kaufmann Foundation have begun to ll this gap, but there is signicant
work to be done in gathering systematic data."
2by [family and friends] are lower than those faced by other sources of capital." Given the
local nature of social networks (Hampton and Wellman 2002), these family and friends are
disproportionately likely to be local.
We code each investor-entrepreneur pair with an indicator variable for \family and
friends" (F&F) based on particular behavioral traits they exhibit on the website (and check
robustness using information from seven entrepreneurs who specically identied their friends
and family among their investors). We nd that F&F are disproportionately co-located with
the entrepreneur, although, importantly, there are also many local investors who are not
F&F and many F&F investors who are distant. We then apply another \dierence" to our
empirical analysis, comparing how the eect of other investors' investment decisions on the
propensity to invest in a given period is mediated by distance after controlling for F&F. The
distance eect disappears.
We interpret this result as implying that the crowdfunding platform eliminates most
distance-related economic frictions normally associated with nancing early stage projects,
such as acquiring information (e.g., local reputation, stage presence), monitoring progress,
and providing input.2 However, it does not eliminate frictions associated with the type of
information about the entrepreneur that is more likely to be held by personally connected
individuals (e.g., tendency to persevere, recover from setbacks, succeed in other endeavors).
This interpretation emphasizing the importance of interpersonal relations in entrepreneurial
nance is consistent with the ndings of Nanda and Khanna (2010), who report that cross-
border social networks play a particularly key role when access to capital is especially dicult.
These results lead us to speculate that there may be path dependency in the process of
accessing distant investors online. To the extent that distant investors disproportionately
rely on information revealed in the investment decisions of others, friends and family might
2In the following section we point out that although \investors" on crowd-funding sites may have philan-
thropic or other utility-seeking motivations that are not strictly pecuniary, they are still faced with allocating
scarce resources and, as the literature on philanthropy suggests, are inuenced by similar transaction costs.
3play an important role in making early investments that generate that information. Conti,
Thursby, and Rothaermel (2010) argue that investments by family and friends can signal the
entrepreneurial commitment to the venture. If true in the crowdfunding setting, this would
imply a limitation to the \equal access for all" potential of the internet. Communications
technologies enable entrepreneurs from anywhere to access capital globally, but in reality
only those entrepreneurs with a sucient base of oine support may be able to do so.
Although crowdfunding is presently small in terms of overall economic activity, it is
growing in both the variety of sectors to which is applied (e.g., music, sports, video games,
education, retail) and the overall value of transactions (Lawton and Marom 2010). Crowd-
funding systems enable users to make investments in various types of projects and ventures,
often in small amounts, outside of a regulated exchange, using online social media plat-
forms that facilitate direct interaction between investors as well as with the individual(s)




Sellaband is an Amsterdam-based, online platform that enables unsigned musicians to raise
nancing to produce an album. Launched on August 15, 2006, it was one of the rst main-
stream websites of its kind and has been referred to as the \granddaddy of crowdfunding"
3There are several interesting papers on the peer-to-peer lending site Prosper.com. However, none address
the spatial dimension of transactions. Perhaps the most related of these, Freedman and Jin (2010), focuses
on complementarity between endorsements and monetary commitments. While this work does not address
the issue of geography, it does look at online networks. Specically, Freedman and Jin focus on the role of
online social groups in supporting online borrowers, which is complementary to our focus on oine social
ties (\friends and family") inuencing the nancing of online entrepreneurs. Also related is Zhang and Liu
(2010), who examine when cumulative investment serves as a quality signal for future investments. Less
directly related, Pope and Sydnor (2010) use Prosper.com as an empirical setting to study the eect of race
on peer-to-peer lending.
4(Kappel 2009). At the time of our data, the Sellaband website worked as follows:4
Musical artists set up a prole page on Sellaband, at no charge, where they include a
photo, bio, links, blog postings, and up to three demo songs.5 Investors search the website,
learn about artist-entrepreneurs, listen to their demos and, if they choose, buy one or more
shares in an artist's future album at $10 per share. Investors see information posted by the
artist as well as how much nancing the artist has raised to date. Figure 1 provides a picture
of a typical artist prole. Funds raised are held in escrow and may not be accessed until the
artist has sold 5,000 shares (raising $50,000). Upon raising $50,000, the artist may spend
those funds according to a plan they develop that is approved by Sellaband to record their
album. As they incur expenses, they send vendor invoices to Sellaband for payment. After
the album is completed, the revenues from album sales are split equally three ways between
the artist, investors, and Sellaband. Investors also receive a compact disc (CD). During our
period of observation, approximately three years, 34 artists raised the full $50,000.
The individuals and groups posting their music on Sellaband are typically early-stage
artists who have never signed a contract with a record label, recorded a professional album,
or performed live outside of local pubs or cafes. At this stage of their careers, their income
from live shows and music sales is negligible. In other words, these individuals face many
of the same nancing challenges and constraints as entrepreneurs in many other settings.
Artists on Sellaband use it to raise capital to nance the recording of an album. They market
themselves, develop a budget, create a plan for promoting their product, and raise nancing.
Sellaband therefore provides a platform for artists to engage in entrepreneurial activities with
a community of investors. For these reasons, we refer to them as \entrepreneurs" throughout
4The website has changed substantially since September 2009, reducing the focus on early-stage artists,
limiting the ability to receive a monetary return, and allowing more exibility to artists in the amount they
can raise and how they can use their funds.
5A \demo," short for \demonstration recording," is an informal recording made solely for the purpose
of pitching a song rather than for release. It is eectively a prototype of the song that they plan to later
record professionally. It is a way for musicians to approximate their ideas and convey them to record labels,
producers, or other artists (Passman 2009).
5the paper.
Similarly, in describing our results we refer to the people providing funds as \investors".
Of course, many of these investors may also have philanthropic or other utility seeking moti-
vations. Some crowdfunding platforms are explicitly designed with philanthropic intentions.
For example, Kiva, a platform which focuses on lending to entrepreneurs in developing coun-
tries, does not allow lenders to charge interest and thus provides no mechanism for earning
a return on their capital. On Sellaband, a platform designed to accommodate prot-seeking
investment motivations by way of a revenue sharing agreement that is tied to the level of
investment, individuals may also be motivated by non-pecuniary returns such as utility from
being philanthropic to help artists achieve their goals. However, even philanthropically-
motivated individuals must allocate scarce resources. While they may not be focused on a
pecuniary return on investment, they are focused on some type of return on their investment
and therefore are motivated to select wisely amongst many projects competing for their
donations. As Stanley Katz states in his Handbook chapter on philanthropy in the arts
(Katz 2006), philanthropic initiatives are increasingly \demanding short-term, measurable
deliverables contracted up-front with grantees, and holding grantees strictly accountable for
what they do and do not do (Porter and Kramer (1999); Rimel (1999)). At the \venture"
end of the new philanthropy, the entrepreneurial techniques of venture capital are being ap-
plied (Letts, Ryan, and Grossman (1997)). Donees are analogized to start-up rms, donors
partner with them, establishing specic and measurable benchmarks, and continuing their
investments only if periodic goals are met" (page 1311). Sellaband artist-entrepreneurs com-
pete for investors. They pitch their projects and enter into contracts that commit them
to sharing their revenue with investors. In summary, even individuals who commit funds
to projects for non-pecuniary reasons are likely to be sensitive to the types of costs that
traditionally favor nancial transactions between co-located individuals. As such, we refer
to individuals who participate in crowdfunding as investors throughout the paper, keeping
6in mind that they may not be motivated by purely pecuniary returns on their investment.
2.2 Data
Our data contain every investment made on Sellaband from its launch in August 2006 until
September 2009. Over this period, there were 4,712 artist-entrepreneurs on Sellaband who
received at least one $10 investment. Of these, 34 raised the $50,000 required to access
their capital to nance the making of their album. The distribution of investments in these
entrepreneurs is highly skewed: these 34 raised 73% of the $2,322,750 invested on the website.
To explore the role of geography in the crowdfunding of early-stage entrepreneurial
projects, we used geographic information disclosed by entrepreneurs and investors on Sell-
aband. For entrepreneurs, location was cross-checked with their ocial website, MySpace,
and Facebook proles. We used the Google Maps APIs6 to retrieve latitude and longitude
for each location7 and to standardize city names. We then manually checked locations and
in the case of multiple or ambiguous matches either cleaned further or coded as missing. Fi-
nally, we calculated geodesic distances between entrepreneurs and investors using a method
developed by Thaddeus Vincenty and implemented by Austin Nichols (Nichols 2003). In our
focal sample, we have distance measures for 90% of entrepreneur-investor pairs.
The other data we use in our main specications is the cumulative investment raised by
the entrepreneur from all investors as of the previous week. In some specications, we also
use song and video uploads that entrepreneurs post on the website and investor proximity
to concert locations (and the dates of those concerts).
We focus our analysis on investments in the 34 entrepreneurs who raised $50,000, ex-
amining the timing of investment and types of investors. We focus on these 34 for several
reasons. First, they are more comparable with each other in terms of their performance on
6See http://code.google.com/apis/maps/ (accessed 13-04-2010)
7According to the data available, we used country, region, city name, and zipcode or country-region-city
triads or country-city pairs.
7the site because they have each successfully gone through the full funding cycle. Second,
we eliminate concerns about right truncation of the data by focusing on entrepreneurs who
complete the funding cycle. Third, we have geographic location information for the vast
majority of the investors in these 34 entrepreneurs because investors must give their location
in order to receive their CD. Fourth, focusing on these 34 eliminates musicians who use
Sellaband sporadically and do not treat the platform as a place for entrepreneurial activity.
Finally, since these 34 entrepreneurs account for nearly three-quarters of all funds raised on
Sellaband, we argue that little information is lost by focusing on them (and our robustness
checks to other samples conrm this).
The main sample is therefore constructed by taking the 34 entrepreneurs who reach
$50,000 during our observation period. Entrepreneurs enter the sample when they receive
their rst investment and exit when they reach the target. The resulting panel is unbalanced.
We identify every investor who invested at least once in one of these 34 entrepreneurs.
Investors enter the sample when they make their rst investment on Sellaband (in any
entrepreneur) because their prole becomes visible to entrepreneurs and other investors at
that time. Investors never exit the sample.
Our main ($50K) sample of entrepreneur-investor pairs is the Cartesian product of the 34
successful entrepreneurs and all investors who invest at least once in one of them. Each pair
appears during each week in which both the entrepreneur and the investor are in the sample.8
Because we use entrepreneur-investor pair xed eects in our regression analysis, pairs with
no investments are dropped. There are 18,827 entrepreneur-investor pairs with at least one
investment from the investor in the entrepreneur and 709,471 entrepreneur-investor-week
observations.
8For example, if Entrepreneur 1 receives her rst investment in week 10 and reaches $50K in week 20,
then she will appear in the sample from weeks 10 through 20. If Investor 2 made his rst investment in week
5, then he is paired with Entrepreneur 1 for weeks 10 through 20. If Investor 3 made his rst investment in
Week 18, then he is paired with Entrepreneur 1 for weeks 18 through 20.
8We present descriptive statistics for the $50K sample in Table 1a. Of these successful
entrepreneurs, the average takes approximately one year (53 weeks) to reach $50,000, al-
though there is considerable variation around the mean from just under two months to more
than two years. The source of nancing is widely distributed; on average entrepreneurs
raise their nancing from 609 dierent investors. Across the 34 $50K-entrepreneurs, there
are 8,149 unique investors. On average, these investors invest in 2.5 $50K-entrepreneurs,
making 4.3 distinct investments (i.e., they often invest on more than one occasion in a single
entrepreneur). They invest a total of $208 across all $50K-entrepreneurs during the period
under study. In other words, investors invest $82 per entrepreneur, on average (see Figure 2
for a detailed frequency distribution of investment instance magnitudes). In terms of artis-
tic eort, these entrepreneurs post 4.3 demo songs on their prole during the fundraising
process, above and beyond the songs they post when they rst launch their prole.9
In the full sample of entrepreneurs (Table 1b), the average entrepreneur only has 11.4
investors. Overall, investors spend an average of $150 on Sellaband, spread over 3.5 en-
trepreneurs and 5.5 dierent investment occasions.
2.3 Geographic variance on Sellaband
Figure 3a presents the geographic distribution of the 34 entrepreneurs who raise $50K. They
are distributed over ve continents with the majority in Europe and the United States.
Figure 3b illustrates the geographic distribution of investors in these entrepreneurs. They
represent 80 countries and are also particularly concentrated in Europe and the eastern
United States.
Table 2 illustrates the quantity of investment by distance. Table 2a splits distance into
9Many entrepreneurs launch their prole with three songs - the maximum number the system accommo-
dates. It is likely that all of these $50K-entrepreneurs launched their prole with three songs, meaning the
average number of songs per entrepreneur is 7.3 (3+4.3). We only have data on songs added, not the number
of songs posted at the time of launching a new prole.
9ve groups. The average investment level within 50 km is signicantly higher than the
investment level over 50 km, conditional on investing. In order to simplify the analysis, we
group all entrepreneur-investor pairs within 50 km as \local" and all others as \distant."
The idea is that \being local" involves an easy commute by car or public transit. Our
results are robust to other thresholds. Table 2b shows that although local investments are
on average higher than distant, $196 compared to $74, there are many more distant investors
and therefore in aggregate they account for the vast majority of total investments. In other
words, conditional on making an investment, local investors invest on average 2.6 times that
of distant investors.
Local investors are also more likely to invest in a particular entrepreneur. Conditional
on making at least one investment in any entrepreneur on Sellaband, 11.4% of individuals
who are local to an entrepreneur invest. In contrast, only 1.5% of distant investors who are
distant to an entrepreneur invest. In this way, investors are disproportionately local.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our econometric analysis is a straightforward framework at the entrepreneur-investor-week
level. Investor i will invest in entrepreneur e in week t if the expected value from investment
is positive:
veit = CumulativeInvet 1 + Xeit + ei +  t + eit
where veit is the value of investing in entrepreneur e at time t by investor i. The value
from investment includes both the monetary expected return of investment as well as any
consumption utility derived from investing in that entrepreneur.  is the perceived marginal
value of cumulative investment as of the previous week. For example, a higher cumulative
investment may indicate that more investors perceive the entrepreneur to be of high quality
and therefore a better investment. Alternatively, investors may derive more consumption
10utility from investing in entrepreneurs who are closer to the $50K threshold. In our main
specication, CumulativeInvet 1 is included as a vector of dummy variables dened by the
$10000 cumulative investment thresholds. In addition,  is the perceived marginal value of
the controls (Xeit) including a control for time since the entrepreneur began on Sellaband,
ei is an entrepreneur-investor xed eect to control for overall tastes of the investor,  t is
a week xed eect to control for changes in the Sellaband environment over time, and eit is
an idiosyncratic error term.
Because veit is a latent variable, we instead examine the decision to invest. Therefore,
to understand the value to the investor in investing in entrepreneur e at time t we use the
following discrete choice specication:
1(Investeit) = CumulativeInvet 1 + Xeit + ei +  t + eit
Consistent with the suggestions of Angrist and Pischke (2009), we estimate this using a
linear probability model although we show robustness to alternative specications. Likely
because our covariates are binary, the vast majority of the predicted probabilities of our
estimates lie between zero and one. Therefore the potential bias of the linear probability
model is reduced in our estimation (Horrace and Oaxaca 2006). The xed eects mean
that our analysis examines the timing of investment for entrepreneur-investor pairs where
we observe at least one investment. The xed eects completely capture the entrepreneur-
investor pairs in which we never see investment, and these pairs can therefore be removed
from the analysis without any empirical consequences. Standard errors are clustered at the
entrepreneur-investor pair level. Cumulative investment is measured at the entrepreneur-
week level. Because the average entrepreneur in our main sample has over 600 investors, the
11cumulative investment number is not driven by any individual investor.10






















Furthermore, in order to understand the role of F&F, we interact F&F with cumulative























The main eect of F&F will drop out due to collinearity with the entrepreneur-investor xed
eects. With this empirical approach we examine when an investor chooses to invest in
a particular entrepreneur, conditional on at least one investment by that investor in that
entrepreneur. Investors often invest more than once in the same entrepreneur during a sin-
gle $50,000 round of fundraising. We assume that the timing of investment is driven by
the change in cumulative investment rather than by another change that is specic to the
entrepreneur-investor pair. We also assume that the entrepreneur-investor and week xed
10We address the potential for bias due to the use of xed eects when several investors invest just once by
showing robustness to random eects and to limiting the sample to investors who invest in the entrepreneur
at least twice.
11We estimate separately for clarity of presentation. All results are robust to using interaction terms in
simultaneous estimation of local and distance.
12eects as well as other covariates control for omitted variables. Our main results hold as
long as there is not an omitted variable that drives lagged cumulative investment, an in-
crease in the value of distant investing, and a simultaneous decrease in the value of local
investing. One plausible variable that might t such a description is concert touring. As an
entrepreneur gains visibility, they may be more able to tour to more distant locations. We
therefore show that our results are robust to controls for touring.
4 Results
We build our results in three steps. First, we document that investors' propensity to invest in
a given week increases as the entrepreneur visibly accumulates capital on the site. Second, we
show that local investors do not follow this pattern. Instead they are most likely to invest
early in the cycle, before an entrepreneur has raised $10,000. Finally, we show that this
dierence between local and distant investors is entirely explained by the group of investors
we label Friends and Family (F&F). The results are robust to numerous specications, some
of which appear in the paper and some in the appendix.12
4.1 Investment propensity increases with funds raised
In Table 3 we show that investment propensity increases as an entrepreneur accumulates
investment. Column (1) reports the main results using the $50K sample. The use of the
$50K sample ensures this is not a simple selection story where only the better entrepreneurs
appear in the sample with higher cumulative investment. Relative to an entrepreneur with
less than $10,000 in investment, a given investor is 2.1 percentage points more likely to invest
12In the main tables we focus on a core specication and a handful of key robustness checks. In the
appendix we verify that our results are robust to numerous alternative specications of the sample chosen,
covariates used, and functional forms.
13in a given week if the entrepreneur has $10,000-$20,000 and 8.4 percentage points more likely
to invest if they have more than $40,000. These increases are large relative to a weekly base
rate of 4.1% during the rst $10,000. We illustrate the estimates of the increase in propensity
to invest in a given week over dierent capital levels in Figure 4. Because we use a linear
probability model, this means we can simply plot the coecient values.
Column (2) shows that the qualitative result is robust to using the full sample of all
entrepreneurs. Column (3) shows robustness to a xed-eects linear regression using quan-
tity invested as the dependent variable rather than a dummy for whether an investment
occurred. Column (4) shows robustness to including controls for artistic eort including
posting videos and songs to the website and giving live performances in the investor's locale.
Videos and concerts are positively related to investments but their inclusion does not aect
the relationship between cumulative investment and propensity to invest.13
Overall, Table 3 shows that investment accelerates as an entrepreneur gets closer to
$50,000. This is consistent with Zhang and Liu (2010) who document a similar pattern on
Prosper.com. Like Zhang and Liu (2010), we argue that this is suggestive evidence of path
dependency: past investment may increase the propensity to invest. It is only suggestive
13For this table, as well as tables 4 and 6, we show robustness to several more specications in the appendix.
Table A1 repeats the main results of the paper to facilitate comparison. In terms of the sample, we show
robustness to the full sample (Table A2), the sample of entrepreneurs who reach $1000 in investments (Table
A3), the sample of entrepreneurs who reach $5,000 in investments (Table A4), the sample constructed by
dropping entrepreneurs from the Netherlands (the home country of the website) (Table A5), the sample
constructed by dropping entrepreneurs from the music hubs of New York City, Los Angeles, Nashville,
London, and Paris (Tables A6 and A7), to including only investors who invest two or more times (Table
A8), and to using as unit of analysis the entrepreneur-investor-month (Table A9). In terms of covariates,
we show robustness to dening cumulative investment as appearing on the Sellaband \charts" as one of
the 25 artist-entrepreneurs closest to raising $50,000 (Table A10), to including just video and song uploads
(Table A11), to including just whether the entrepreneur performed in the investor's locale (Table A12), to
including videos, songs, and performances (Table A13), to removing focal investor's past investment from
the entrepreneur's accumulated capital (Table A14), and to including whether the entrepreneur appeared in
the Sellaband Newsletter (Table A15). In terms of the functional form, we show robustness to xed-eects
logit (Table A16), xed-eects poisson regression on the total parts invested (Table A17), linear regression
on the total parts invested and (when applicable) disinvested (Table A18), to random eects (Table A19).
The appendix also shows robustness of Tables 4 and 6 to alternative measures of \local" (Tables A20 and
A21), treating missing geographic information as distant (Table A22), combining distant and local in the
same regression and using interactions (Table A23), to alternative denitions of F&F (Table A24).
14because, in the absence of a truly exogenous shock to investment, we cannot reject the
possibility that some other activity may cause the acceleration in investment. Nevertheless,
to the extent that the xed eects and the covariates on entrepreneurial eort control such
activities, the underlying pattern in the data, combined with the prominent placement of
cumulative investment information on the website, suggest that high levels of cumulative
investment may cause an increase in the rate at which new investment arrives.
4.2 Local and distant investors are dierent
In Table 4 we stratify the data between local and distant investors. Local investors are
more likely to invest over the rst $20,000 than later. In contrast, the results for distant
investors resemble the overall results shown in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) show our main
specication. In Figure 5 we provide a graphical representation of the propensity to invest at
dierent stages in the investment cycle. Local and distant investors clearly display distinct
patterns; distant investors' propensity to invest rises as the entrepreneur accumulates capital,
whereas local investors' propensity does not.
As mentioned above, our interpretation of these results holds as long as there is not
an omitted variable that drives lagged cumulative investment, an increase in the value of
distant investing, and a decrease in the value of local investing. In columns (3) and (4) we
address the possibility that entrepreneurs increase their eort to attract distant investors
as they become more successful. They might perform concerts further from home or they
might post more material on their website. Specically, we show robustness to whether the
entrepreneur performs within 50 km of the investor and whether the entrepreneur posted a
new song or video to their website. The qualitative dierences between local and distant
investment patterns remain.
In the appendix, we show that this general relationship is broadly robust to many other
specications. The only notable dierence in a few of the robustness checks is a at relation-
15ship between investment propensity and cumulative investment for local investors, rather
than a decreasing relationship. Still, the clear distinction between distant and local holds in
all cases: distant investors signicantly increase their propensity to invest as the entrepreneur
accumulates capital whereas local investors do not.
4.3 Friends and Family
In this section we show that a particular type of investor, whom we label as \Friends and
Family" (F&F) of a particular entrepreneur, explains the observed dierence between local
and distant investors. These individuals likely joined this market-making platform to fund
that particular entrepreneur. We dene F&F by the following three characteristics:
1. The F&F investor invested in the focal entrepreneur before investing in any other (i.e.
the investor is likely to have joined the system for the focal entrepreneur)
2. The F&F investor's investment in the focal entrepreneur is their largest investment
3. The investor invests in no more than three other entrepreneurs (i.e. the focal en-
trepreneur remains a key reason for being on the site)
To conrm the validity of our measure, we received information from seven successful
entrepreneurs on Sellaband on the investors they knew independently of Sellaband. Specif-
ically, we asked them to identify from their list of investors all family members and friends
that they knew prior to joining Sellaband. Our measure captured 76% of the investors that
these seven entrepreneurs identied, as well as a number of investors that the entrepreneurs
did not know personally. We later show that the dierence between F&F and others holds
when we limit the sample to these seven entrepreneurs and their hand-coded list of F&F.
In Table 5 we provide descriptive statistics for the F&F sample. Using investor-level
measures of the use of the website's communications tools (emails sent through the website
16and comments on webpages), in Table 5a we show that they use Sellaband less intensively
than other investors. Specically, they send approximately 34 times fewer emails, post 29
times fewer comments, receive ve times fewer emails, and receive 16 times fewer comments
than non-F&F investors, on average. We conjecture that F&F might behave dierently
on the Sellaband site because they interact with the entrepreneur through other channels.
Overall, these data suggest that F&F are a distinct group.
Furthermore, in Table 5b we show that F&F investors are disproportionately active at
the beginning of the investment process. On average, F&F account for approximately one
third of the focal entrepreneur's total investment when they have raised their rst $500 (or
similarly after the rst four weeks). In contrast, they account for only one fth by the end
of the fundraising cycle.
In Table 5c we show that although some F&F investors are distant, they are dispropor-
tionately local. In terms of number of investors, F&F account for 65% of investors under 25
km (61% between 25-50 km) but only 16% of distant investors. In terms of dollars, F&F ac-
count for 36% of investments under 25 km (60% between 25-50 km) but only 16% of distant
investment. Together, the statistics in these tables raise the possibility that the dierence
between local and distant investors might be explained by F&F.
Next, we run our main specication on local and distant investors, but include an inter-
action of capital levels with an indicator for F&F (Table 6). The results show that local and
distant investors are qualitatively similar, conditional on F&F. Particularly, in all specica-
tions, for both local and distant investors, F&F tend to invest early in the funding cycle and
non-F&F tend to invest later. We illustrate this result in Figure 6 which shows that non-
F&F investors, both local and distant, increase their propensity to invest as the entrepreneur
accumulates capital whereas F&F investors do not.
A potential concern with our interpretation of these results is that our denition only
proxies for Friends and Family. It is likely that we include many investors who are not really
17F&F, and that we exclude some investors that are F&F. In order to address this concern, we
examined investments in the seven entrepreneurs who identied their Friends and Family to
us. By focusing on just these seven entrepreneurs, we do not have enough local investments
to identify the coecients of a local-only regression. Therefore, we combine local and distant
investors and re-run the F&F analysis using all investors in these seven entrepreneurs and the
F&F that they identied. We present the results in Table 7: even with the limited sample,
for the F&F group we see that investment propensity decreases as cumulative investment
approaches $50,000. Table 7 shows that the results of Table 6 are robust to this more direct
denition of F&F. We interpret this result as providing validity for our main denition of
F&F.
In summary, our results suggest that there is no systematic dierence between local and
distant investors, except to the extent that social networks (as measured by F&F) are dis-
proportionately local.
4.4 Is this just buying music?
One potential alternative interpretation of the dierence between F&F and others is that
other investors are not investing in the entrepreneur, instead they are simply buying the
music in advance. As mentioned above, when investors own shares in an entrepreneur that
raises $50K, the investor receives a CD. If an investor is really just buying music, it may
make sense to wait until the nancing is almost complete, and therefore such an investor
may invest only when the entrepreneur is close to $50K. In Table 8, we show that the results
appear to be driven by more than just dierences across groups in the value of the CD.
Column (1) shows that the results change very little if we focus only on those investors
who invested in the same artist on at least two occasions. This group would derive more
value from the rst investment than the second since they receive the CD from their rst
18investment, but we still see the same patterns for F&F versus other investors.
Columns (2) and (3) exploit a policy change on the Sellaband website. Prior to December
2008, investors received a CD for every share that they purchased. Sellaband then changed
their policy and only provided a `free' CD for the rst share purchased. Column (2) shows
the overall dierence between F&F and others before the policy change and column (3)
shows the dierence after. The main results of the paper hold: F&F invest early and others
invest late, irrespective of whether a CD is given for each part purchased.
Table 8 therefore suggests that the results are unlikely to be driven by motives related
to purchasing music and instead appear to be driven by the expected pecuniary and non-
pecuniary returns from investment. To reiterate, we cannot separately identify whether
investors are buying shares motivated by pecuniary returns or as a way to receive consump-
tion utility through the potential to support and interact with an early-stage artist.
5 Conclusion
We examine the role of distance in an online platform for nancing early stage artist-
entrepreneurs. We nd that investment patterns over time are independent of geographic
distance between entrepreneur and investor after controlling for the entrepreneur's oine
social network. This result contrasts with the existing literature that emphasizes the im-
portance of spatial proximity in entrepreneurial nance. Instead, our result suggests that
online mechanisms can reduce economic frictions associated with investing in early-stage
projects over long distances. Only the spatial correlation of pre-existing social networks is
not resolved, and the online mechanisms do not yet eliminate frictions related to information
that is easily conveyed through a social network. This is consistent with prior research on
online activity that shows many, but not all, distance-related frictions are reduced in the
online setting (Blum and Goldfarb 2006, Hortacsu, Martinez-Jerez, and Douglas 2009).
19Furthermore, our result emphasizes the important role that friends and family may play
online and oine in generating early investment in entrepreneurial ventures. Consistent
with Conti, Thursby, and Rothaermel (2010), we speculate that this early investment may
serve as a signal of entrepreneurial commitment. Later investors may use this signal thereby
increasing the likelihood of further funding by way of access to distant sources of capital.
Finally, we comment on the implications of crowdfunding in our particular industry
setting, recorded music. Over the past two decades, this industry has experienced signicant
changes. Industry revenues have declined by approximately 50% over 10 years, which many
industry experts attribute to piracy through online le sharing (Passman 2009). At the
same time, costs associated with the production and distribution of music have also dropped
substantially due to the development of inexpensive production software and the digital
distribution of music over the internet. However, production costs are not zero and recording
artists are commonly cash constrained. In the vertically integrated industry set-up, large
record companies provided both nancing and a full suite of services (e.g., producer, studio,
cover design, distribution, auxiliary musicians) in exchange for ownership of or equity in the
artists' intellectual property. As the major labels decline in importance, artists have fewer
options to relieve cash constraints by borrowing against, or selling equity in, their intellectual
property. Crowdfunding helps overcome that constraint by creating a market for the most
salient asset available to aspiring new artists { their ideas, vision, and future intellectual
property { thereby facilitating nancing from distant strangers. Thus, crowdfunding may
help reduce an important market failure.
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23Table 1a: Descriptive stats - $50K (main) Sample
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Entrepreneur Level
Investors at $50K 34 608.8 220.9 316 1,338
Weeks to $50K 34 53.1 34.6 8 124
Songs uploadedy 34 4.29 8.02 0 32
Videos uploaded 34 0.68 0.47 0 1
Investor level
Number of 50K entrepreneurs invested in 8,149 2.54 4.23 1 34
Number of distinct investments 8,149 4.33 12.78 1 330
Total amount invested across 50K entrepreneurs ($) 8,149 208 1,083.9 0 33,430
Entrepreneur-Investor level
Investment amount ($) 18,827 82 379.8 0 23,500
Geographic distance (km) 18,827 5,118 5,658 0.003 19,827
Number of investments in same entrepreneur 18,827 1.7 2.3 1 72
Position in funding cycle at rst investment ($) 18,827 12,099 13,361 0 49,990
Entrepreneur-Investor-Week level
Investment amount ($) 709,471 2.378 40.82 0 15,000
Live show proximate to investor 709,471 0.002 0.046 0 1
24Table 1b: Descriptive stats - Full Sample
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Entrepreneur Level
Investors 4,712 11.4 60.5 1 1,338
Total Investment 4,712 49.3 437.5 0 5,000
Songs uploadedy 4,712 1.82 2.686 0 59
Videos uploaded 4,712 0.11 0.378 0 8
Investor level
Number of entrepreneurs invested in 15,517 3.46 21.1 1 1,835
Number of distinct investments 15,517 5.52 34.3.1 1 2,155
Total amount invested across all entrepreneurs ($) 15,517 149.7 991.9 0 38,440
Entrepreneur-Investor level
Investment amount ($) 24,862 42.69 253.61 0 23,500
Geographic distance (km) 24,862 4,831.5 5,523.6 .003 19,863
Number of investments in same entrepreneur 24,862 1.79 2.52 1 72
Position in funding cycle at rst investment ($) 24,862 9,998 12,464 0 49,990
Entrepreneur-Investor-Week level
Investment amount ($) 1,175,492 1.83 33.71 0 15,000
yEntrepreneurs may upload 1 to 3 songs when registering on the website. Since we do not have
access to these data, the initial songs are not included in this count.
25Table 2a: Local versus Distant - $50K Sample
Distance Obs. Mean Investment Total Investment % of Total
0-5 km 191 255.76 48,850 2.9%
5-50 km 973 184.62 179,640 10.6%
50-500 km 4,403 67.67 297,970 17.5%
500-3,000 km 4,232 79.56 336,680 19.8%
> 3,000 km 9,028 75.15 678,410 39.9%
Not Available 1,999 79.26 158,450 9.3%
Table 2b: Local versus Distant, consolidated - $50K Sample
Obs. Mean Investment Total Investment % of Total
Local (under 50 km) 1,164 196 228,490 13.5%
Distant (over 50 km) 17,663 74 1,313,060 77.2%
Not Available 1,999 79 158,450 9.3%
26Table 3: Investment propensity increases over time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
$50K sample Full sample Total Parts Additional covariates
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0213*** 0.0109*** 0.1216*** 0.0211***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0176) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0261*** 0.0134*** 0.1654*** 0.0277***
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0280) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0420*** 0.0266*** 0.2575*** 0.0442***
(0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0353) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0840*** 0.0691*** 0.6279*** 0.0871***
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0560) (0.0027)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0033*** -0.0032*** -0.0095*** -0.0018***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0035) (0.0002)
Videos uploaded (lagged) 0.0084*
(0.0043)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0011
(0.0009)
Investor proximate to Live Show 0.0098*
(0.0056)
Observations 709,471 1,175,492 709,471 703,417
R-squared 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.011
Number of group 18,827 24,862 18,827 18,827
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(2)-(4) and total investment in column (3).
Unless otherwise specied, sample is the $50K sample. Column (4) adds controls for videos and songs
uploaded by the entrepreneur, and live shows proximate to investor. All regressions include a full set
of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard
errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
27Table 4: Local and distant investors are dierent
(1) (2) (3) (4)




LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0020 0.0215*** 0.0051 0.0212***
(0.0076) (0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0013)
$20-30K accum. capital -0.0287*** 0.0283*** -0.0258** 0.0299***
(0.0103) (0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital -0.0334*** 0.0451*** -0.0309*** 0.0473***
(0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0114) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital -0.0254* 0.0891*** -0.0211 0.0922***
(0.0134) (0.0028) (0.0133) (0.0028)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0001 -0.0018***
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Videos uploaded (lagged) 0.2435*** 0.0011
(0.0454) (0.0042)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0038 -0.0010
(0.0029) (0.0009)
Investor proximate to Live Show 0.0094 0.0031
(0.0086) (0.0148)
Observations 57,855 651,616 57,711 645,706
R-squared 0.042 0.012 0.042 0.012
Number of group 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment and sample is the $50K sample. Local is dened as within 50 km from
the entrepreneur. Columns (3)-(4) add controls for videos and songs uploaded by the entrepreneur and live
shows proximate to investor. All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor
pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
28Table 5a: F&F use the website dierently
F&F Not F&F
Average # of emails sent to entrepreneurs 0.24 8.25
Average # of comments sent to entrepreneurs 0.44 12.74
Average # of emails received from entrepreneurs 13.19 68.97
Average # of comments received from en-
trepreneurs
1.14 18.77
Table 5b: F&F are disproportionately active at the beginning
First $500 First 4 weeks Full $50k
F&F 34% 37% 22%
Not F&F 66% 63% 78%
Table 5c: F&F are disproportionately local
Pairs 0-25 km 25-50 km > 50 km
F&F 65% 61% 16%
Not F&F 35% 39% 84%
Dollars 0-25 km 25-50 km > 50 km
F&F 36% 60% 16%









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 7: F&F denition based on interviews with seven entrepreneurs
VARIABLES (1) (2)
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0076** 0.0096***
(0.0032) (0.0033)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0227*** 0.0271***
(0.0050) (0.0052)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0280*** 0.0323***
(0.0057) (0.0059)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0947*** 0.1004***
(0.0078) (0.0080)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0543** -0.0405*
(0.0217) (0.0212)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0712*** -0.0571***
(0.0216) (0.0209)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0798*** -0.0656**
(0.0299) (0.0290)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1317*** -0.1171***
(0.0235) (0.0227)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0008** -0.0008***
(0.0004) (0.0002)
Videos uploaded (lagged) 0.0520***
(0.0104)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0048**
(0.0019)






Number of group 3,888 3,888
Dependent variable is any investment. Sample includes
all investments in the seven entrepreneurs who identi-
ed their Friends and Family. All regressions include
a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor
pair (dierenced out) and each week. Column 2
adds controls for songs and videos uploaded by the
entrepreneur and live shows proximate to the investor.
Local and distant combined for sample size reasons.
Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
31Table 8: Only investors who invest two or more times (Column 1). Before and after change
in incentives (Columns 2 and 3).
(1) (2) (3)
Before After
VARIABLES Full time period Change in incentives Change in incentives
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0239*** 0.0229*** 0.0089
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0116)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0369*** 0.0307*** 0.0659***
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0090)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0592*** 0.0527*** 0.0757***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0097)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.1174*** 0.1069*** 0.1275***
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0107)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0709*** -0.1006*** 0.1348*
(0.0164) (0.0053) (0.0699)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1066*** -0.1485*** -0.0840***
(0.0198) (0.0057) (0.0274)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1345*** -0.1851*** -0.1009***
(0.0196) (0.0060) (0.0275)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1932*** -0.2729*** -0.1534***
(0.0225) (0.0070) (0.0280)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0024*** -0.0043*** 0.0008*
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Observations 585,803 628,732 80,739
R-squared 0.015 0.020 0.019
Number of group 14,790 18,447 3,920
Dependent variable is any investment in columns and sample is the $50K sample. In column
(1), only investors who invest at least two or more times are included. Column (2) includes
all investments that took place before the change in incentives (December 2008), while column
(3) those that happened after. In the before period, investors would receive one CD for
every 10$ invested in the entrepreneur. After the incentives change, only the rst 10$ would
entitle the investor to receive a CD. All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each
entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered
at the pair level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
32Figure 1: Sellaband screenshot
Figure 2: Frequency of investment instance magnitudes (50K sample).
33Figure 3a: Map of $50K entrepreneurs locations
Figure 3b: Map of investor locations ($50K artists)
34Figure 4: Relative propensity to invest for all investors over capital levels. Baseline is
propensity to invest between $0-10K.
35Figure 5: Relative propensity to invest over capital levels for local versus distant investors.
Baseline is propensity to invest between $0-10K within each group.
36Figure 6: Relative propensity to invest over capital levels for F&F versus not-F&F investors
(both local and distant). Baseline is propensity to invest between $0-10K within each group.
376 Appendix
Table A-1: $50K (main) Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0213*** 0.0020 0.0215*** 0.0322*** 0.0233***
(0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0012) (0.0091) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0261*** -0.0287*** 0.0283*** 0.0276** 0.0329***
(0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0017) (0.0119) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0420*** -0.0334*** 0.0451*** 0.0337** 0.0517***
(0.0021) (0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0143) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0840*** -0.0254* 0.0891*** 0.0521*** 0.1086***
(0.0027) (0.0134) (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0028)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0803*** -0.0909***
(0.0121) (0.0065)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1184*** -0.1377***
(0.0130) (0.0071)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1397*** -0.1644***
(0.0155) (0.0073)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1590*** -0.2521***
(0.0181) (0.0079)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0033*** -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0034*** -0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Observations 709,471 57,855 651,616 57,855 651,616
R-squared 0.012 0.042 0.012 0.050 0.019
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample. All
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out)
and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
38Table A-2: Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
VARIABLES Invest=1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0109*** -0.0075* 0.0116*** 0.0173*** 0.0140***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0134*** -0.0257*** 0.0154*** 0.0218*** 0.0208***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0266*** -0.0275*** 0.0293*** 0.0357*** 0.0376***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.011) (0.002)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0691*** -0.0153** 0.0741*** 0.0590*** 0.0952***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0551*** -0.0753***
(0.008) (0.004)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0905*** -0.1150***
(0.009) (0.005)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1146*** -0.1477***
(0.013) (0.005)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1281*** -0.2338***
(0.016) (0.006)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0032*** -0.0047*** -0.0030*** -0.0046*** -0.0029***
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Observations 1,175,492 99,564 1,075,928 99,564 1,075,928
R-squared 0.010 0.033 0.010 0.037 0.015
Number of group 24,862 1,715 23,147 1,715 23,147
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the full sample. All regres-
sions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each
week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
39Table A-3: $1K Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
$1K Sample $1K Sample $1K Sample $1K Sample $1K Sample
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0108*** -0.0076* 0.0116*** 0.0172*** 0.0140***
(0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0009) (0.0061) (0.0009)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0133*** -0.0260*** 0.0154*** 0.0215*** 0.0207***
(0.0012) (0.0058) (0.0012) (0.0073) (0.0012)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0267*** -0.0276*** 0.0294*** 0.0354*** 0.0376***
(0.0015) (0.0069) (0.0015) (0.0113) (0.0015)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0692*** -0.0147* 0.0741*** 0.0590*** 0.0952***
(0.0021) (0.0077) (0.0021) (0.0147) (0.0023)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0552*** -0.0755***
(0.0084) (0.0045)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0905*** -0.1151***
(0.0094) (0.0051)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1144*** -0.1479***
(0.0131) (0.0055)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1274*** -0.2338***
(0.0161) (0.0063)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0031*** -0.0047*** -0.0030*** -0.0046*** -0.0028***
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Observations 1,155,845 98,118 1,057,727 98,118 1,057,727
R-squared 0.010 0.033 0.010 0.038 0.015
Number of group 24,411 1,681 22,730 1,681 22,730
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $1K sample (all en-
trepreneurs who have raised at least $1000). All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each
entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the
pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
40Table A-4: $5K Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
$5K Sample $5K Sample $5K Sample $5K Sample $5K Sample
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0114*** -0.0087* 0.0121*** 0.0160*** 0.0144***
(0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0009) (0.0061) (0.0009)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0141*** -0.0286*** 0.0162*** 0.0190** 0.0214***
(0.0012) (0.0059) (0.0012) (0.0074) (0.0012)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0279*** -0.0302*** 0.0307*** 0.0328*** 0.0387***
(0.0015) (0.0071) (0.0016) (0.0114) (0.0016)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0705*** -0.0171** 0.0755*** 0.0561*** 0.0963***
(0.0021) (0.0080) (0.0022) (0.0148) (0.0023)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0551*** -0.0756***
(0.0084) (0.0045)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0909*** -0.1150***
(0.0094) (0.0051)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1148*** -0.1477***
(0.0130) (0.0055)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1276*** -0.2338***
(0.0161) (0.0063)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0032*** -0.0046*** -0.0030*** -0.0045*** -0.0029***
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Observations 1,070,501 89,276 981,225 89,276 981,225
R-squared 0.011 0.035 0.011 0.040 0.016
Number of group 23,269 1,544 21,725 1,544 21,725
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $5K sample (all en-
trepreneurs who have raised at least $5000). All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each
entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the
pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
41Table A-5: No entrepreneurs from Holland
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0244*** -0.0150 0.0251*** 0.0133 0.0270***
(0.0013) (0.0131) (0.0013) (0.0157) (0.0013)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0285*** -0.0634*** 0.0312*** 0.0018 0.0349***
(0.0018) (0.0157) (0.0018) (0.0187) (0.0018)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0458*** -0.0726*** 0.0499*** 0.0116 0.0564***
(0.0023) (0.0186) (0.0023) (0.0234) (0.0023)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0885*** -0.0720*** 0.0944*** 0.0230 0.1128***
(0.0029) (0.0194) (0.0030) (0.0257) (0.0030)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0938*** -0.0960***
(0.0220) (0.0073)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1521*** -0.1382***
(0.0228) (0.0081)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1853*** -0.1698***
(0.0264) (0.0082)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.2032*** -0.2633***
(0.0294) (0.0091)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0005** -0.0031* -0.0005** -0.0029* -0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0002)
Observations 558,150 20,841 537,309 20,841 537,309
R-squared 0.011 0.039 0.012 0.050 0.018
Number of group 16,372 663 15,709 663 15,709
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample
without entrepreneurs from Holland. All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each
entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered
at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
42Table A-6: No entrepreneurs from music hubs (NYC, LA, Nashville, London, or Paris)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0195*** 0.0121 0.0188*** 0.0405*** 0.0198***
(0.0014) (0.0088) (0.0014) (0.0108) (0.0014)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0314*** -0.0170 0.0335*** 0.0339** 0.0358***
(0.0021) (0.0147) (0.0022) (0.0168) (0.0021)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0451*** -0.0248 0.0477*** 0.0314* 0.0525***
(0.0025) (0.0154) (0.0026) (0.0184) (0.0026)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0969*** -0.0204 0.1022*** 0.0460* 0.1191***
(0.0034) (0.0204) (0.0035) (0.0238) (0.0036)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0693*** -0.0592***
(0.0131) (0.0069)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1033*** -0.1017***
(0.0138) (0.0082)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1181*** -0.1551***
(0.0168) (0.0091)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1409*** -0.2400***
(0.0209) (0.0097)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0045*** -0.0049*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0042***
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0004)
Observations 482,683 44,928 437,755 44,928 437,755
R-squared 0.013 0.043 0.014 0.049 0.020
Number of group 12,310 796 11,514 796 11,514
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample
without entrepreneurs from music hubs (New York, Los Angeles, Nashville, London, or Paris).
All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced
out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
43Table A-7: No entrepreneurs from music hubs (NYC, LA, Nashville, London, or Paris) and
controlling for live shows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0183*** 0.0123 0.0175*** 0.0371*** 0.0184***
(0.0014) (0.0088) (0.0014) (0.0108) (0.0014)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0334*** -0.0188 0.0355*** 0.0287* 0.0374***
(0.0021) (0.0146) (0.0022) (0.0168) (0.0021)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0475*** -0.0274* 0.0501*** 0.0252 0.0544***
(0.0025) (0.0153) (0.0026) (0.0183) (0.0026)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.1006*** -0.0222 0.1060*** 0.0404* 0.1223***
(0.0034) (0.0202) (0.0035) (0.0237) (0.0036)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0618*** -0.0553***
(0.0130) (0.0070)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0966*** -0.0931***
(0.0136) (0.0081)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1116*** -0.1450***
(0.0166) (0.0090)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1335*** -0.2307***
(0.0208) (0.0096)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0023*** -0.0014 -0.0023*** -0.0010 -0.0020***
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0003)
Videos uploaded (lagged) 0.0019 0.1633*** -0.0029 0.1670*** -0.0021
(0.0053) (0.0593) (0.0051) (0.0579) (0.0051)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0010)
Investor proximate to Live Show 0.0124* 0.0365*** -0.0052 0.0378*** -0.0027
(0.0068) (0.0140) (0.0204) (0.0139) (0.0202)
Observations 478,251 44,815 433,436 44,815 433,436
R-squared 0.012 0.040 0.013 0.046 0.018
Number of group 12,310 796 11,514 796 11,514
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample
without entrepreneurs from music hubs (New York, Los Angeles, Nashville, London, or
Paris). Controls for videos and songs uploaded by the entrepreneurs, as well as live shows
proximate to the investor are included. All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each
entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at
the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
44Table A-8: Only investors who invest two or more times.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0235*** 0.0030 0.0239*** 0.0068 0.0242***
(0.0013) (0.0130) (0.0013) (0.0127) (0.0013)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0362*** -0.0048 0.0368*** 0.0052 0.0374***
(0.0018) (0.0204) (0.0018) (0.0201) (0.0018)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0581*** 0.0114 0.0590*** 0.0254 0.0598***
(0.0022) (0.0229) (0.0022) (0.0228) (0.0022)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.1154*** 0.0327 0.1171*** 0.0464* 0.1188***
(0.0029) (0.0264) (0.0029) (0.0268) (0.0029)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0353 -0.0757***
(0.0479) (0.0165)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0852 -0.1071***
(0.0546) (0.0203)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1081** -0.1351***
(0.0489) (0.0210)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1007* -0.2007***
(0.0600) (0.0242)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0024*** -0.0016 -0.0025*** -0.0017 -0.0024***
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Observations 585,803 16,900 568,903 16,900 568,903
R-squared 0.014 0.022 0.015 0.023 0.015
Number of group 14,790 374 14,416 374 14,416
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample
where only investors who invest at least two or more times are included. All regressions
include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and
each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
45Table A-9: Entrepreneur-Investor-Month as a unit of analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0556*** 0.0054 0.0539*** 0.0823*** 0.0571***
(0.0032) (0.0183) (0.0033) (0.0214) (0.0033)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0682*** -0.1062*** 0.0745*** 0.0503* 0.0885***
(0.0043) (0.0235) (0.0043) (0.0271) (0.0043)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.1373*** -0.0821*** 0.1440*** 0.1059*** 0.1707***
(0.0053) (0.0263) (0.0055) (0.0322) (0.0054)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.1180*** -0.1225*** 0.1257*** 0.0588 0.1618***
(0.0064) (0.0299) (0.0066) (0.0403) (0.0066)
$10-20k accum. capital * F&F -0.2038*** -0.2334***
(0.0280) (0.0153)
$20-30k accum. capital * F&F -0.3174*** -0.3916***
(0.0296) (0.0169)
$30-40k accum. capital * F&F -0.3818*** -0.5163***
(0.0356) (0.0172)
$40-50k accum. capital * F&F -0.3833*** -0.5725***
(0.0416) (0.0191)
Weeks on Sellaband 0.0191*** 0.0377*** 0.0188*** 0.0360*** 0.0216***
(0.0024) (0.0089) (0.0025) (0.0093) (0.0025)
Observations 192,030 15,242 176,788 15,242 176,788
R-squared 0.020 0.120 0.020 0.145 0.038
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample.
Unit of analysis is the entrepreneur-investor-month. All regressions include a full set
of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each month. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
46Table A-10: Overall charts rather than cumulative investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
Entrepreneur in overall charts (lagged) 0.0161*** -0.0161*** 0.0180*** -0.0009 0.0210***
(0.0010) (0.0043) (0.0011) (0.0066) (0.0011)
Entrepreneur in overall charts * FFF -0.0260*** -0.0321***
(0.0075) (0.0027)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0009*** -0.0021** -0.0007*** -0.0021** -0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Observations 703,417 57,711 645,706 57,711 645,706
R-squared 0.007 0.038 0.007 0.038 0.007
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample. Instead of
cumulative investment, the regressions introduce a dummy for the presence of the entrepreneurs on the
overall charts (Top 25). All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor
pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
47Table A-11: Controlling for songs and video uploads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0211*** 0.0051 0.0212*** 0.0323*** 0.0229***
(0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0013) (0.0092) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0277*** -0.0257** 0.0299*** 0.0277** 0.0343***
(0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0017) (0.0121) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0442*** -0.0307*** 0.0473*** 0.0338** 0.0536***
(0.0021) (0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0144) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0870*** -0.0214 0.0922*** 0.0536*** 0.1115***
(0.0027) (0.0133) (0.0028) (0.0173) (0.0028)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0738*** -0.0854***
(0.0119) (0.0065)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1121*** -0.1305***
(0.0127) (0.0071)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1338*** -0.1564***
(0.0153) (0.0073)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1531*** -0.2444***
(0.0178) (0.0079)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0018*** -0.0001 -0.0018*** 0.0002 -0.0016***
(0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Videos uploaded (lagged) 0.0084* 0.2433*** 0.0011 0.2441*** 0.0034
(0.0043) (0.0454) (0.0042) (0.0440) (0.0041)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0012 -0.0041 -0.0010 -0.0038 -0.0018*
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0009)
Observations 703,417 57,711 645,706 57,711 645,706
R-squared 0.011 0.042 0.012 0.050 0.018
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5), sample is the $50K sample and
controls for videos and songs uploaded by the entrepreneurs are included. All regressions
include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and
each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
48Table A-12: Controlling for live shows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0213*** 0.0021 0.0215*** 0.0322*** 0.0233***
(0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0012) (0.0091) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0261*** -0.0288*** 0.0283*** 0.0276** 0.0329***
(0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0017) (0.0119) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0420*** -0.0336*** 0.0451*** 0.0335** 0.0517***
(0.0021) (0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0143) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0840*** -0.0251* 0.0891*** 0.0524*** 0.1086***
(0.0027) (0.0134) (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0028)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0803*** -0.0909***
(0.0121) (0.0065)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1184*** -0.1377***
(0.0130) (0.0071)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1396*** -0.1644***
(0.0155) (0.0073)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1590*** -0.2521***
(0.0181) (0.0079)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0033*** -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0034*** -0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Investor proximate to Live Show 0.0079 0.0090 -0.0053 0.0085 -0.0043
(0.0056) (0.0087) (0.0147) (0.0087) (0.0146)
Observations 709,471 57,855 651,616 57,855 651,616
R-squared 0.012 0.042 0.012 0.050 0.019
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5), sample is the $50K sample and
a control for live shows proximate to the investor is included. All regressions include a
full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out) and each week.
Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
49Table A-13: Controlling for live shows, songs, and video uploads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0211*** 0.0051 0.0212*** 0.0324*** 0.0229***
(0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0013) (0.0092) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0277*** -0.0258** 0.0299*** 0.0277** 0.0343***
(0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0017) (0.0121) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0442*** -0.0309*** 0.0473*** 0.0335** 0.0536***
(0.0021) (0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0144) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0871*** -0.0211 0.0922*** 0.0539*** 0.1115***
(0.0027) (0.0133) (0.0028) (0.0173) (0.0028)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0738*** -0.0854***
(0.0119) (0.0065)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1121*** -0.1305***
(0.0127) (0.0071)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1337*** -0.1565***
(0.0153) (0.0073)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1531*** -0.2444***
(0.0178) (0.0079)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0018*** -0.0001 -0.0018*** 0.0002 -0.0016***
(0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Videos uploaded (lagged) 0.0084* 0.2435*** 0.0011 0.2444*** 0.0034
(0.0043) (0.0454) (0.0042) (0.0440) (0.0041)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0011 -0.0038 -0.0010 -0.0035 -0.0018*
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0009)
Investor proximate to Live Show 0.0098* 0.0094 0.0031 0.0090 0.0043
(0.0056) (0.0086) (0.0148) (0.0087) (0.0147)
Observations 703,417 57,711 645,706 57,711 645,706
R-squared 0.011 0.042 0.012 0.050 0.018
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5), sample is the $50K sample and controls
for videos and songs uploaded by the entrepreneurs as well as live shows proximate to investor
are included. All regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor
pair (dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
50Table A-14: Focal investor's past investment not included in entrepreneur's accumulated
capital.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0207*** 0.0030 0.0210*** 0.0320*** 0.0226***
(0.0012) (0.0077) (0.0012) (0.0092) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0253*** -0.0282*** 0.0274*** 0.0287** 0.0321***
(0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0017) (0.0120) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0413*** -0.0332*** 0.0445*** 0.0325** 0.0511***
(0.0021) (0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0143) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0830*** -0.0259* 0.0881*** 0.0531*** 0.1076***
(0.0027) (0.0135) (0.0027) (0.0171) (0.0028)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0774*** -0.0894***
(0.0119) (0.0064)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1177*** -0.1374***
(0.0129) (0.0071)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1360*** -0.1644***
(0.0154) (0.0073)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1592*** -0.2507***
(0.0176) (0.0079)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0033*** -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0034*** -0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Observations 709,471 57,855 651,616 57,855 651,616
R-squared 0.012 0.042 0.012 0.050 0.018
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample. All
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced
out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
51Table A-15: Controlling for entrepreneurs' mentions in the Sellaband Newsletter.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0213*** 0.0022 0.0216*** 0.0323*** 0.0233***
(0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0012) (0.0091) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0261*** -0.0287*** 0.0283*** 0.0275** 0.0329***
(0.0017) (0.0103) (0.0017) (0.0119) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0419*** -0.0335*** 0.0451*** 0.0336** 0.0517***
(0.0021) (0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0143) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0840*** -0.0252* 0.0890*** 0.0522*** 0.1086***
(0.0027) (0.0134) (0.0028) (0.0174) (0.0028)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0803*** -0.0909***
(0.0121) (0.0065)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1182*** -0.1377***
(0.0129) (0.0071)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1395*** -0.1644***
(0.0154) (0.0073)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1588*** -0.2520***
(0.0181) (0.0079)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0033*** -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0034*** -0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0003)
Artist in Newsletter (lagged) 0.0035** 0.0104 0.0026 0.0075 0.0015
(0.0016) (0.0083) (0.0017) (0.0081) (0.0017)
Observations 709,471 57,855 651,616 57,855 651,616
R-squared 0.012 0.042 0.012 0.050 0.019
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample and
a control for the entrepreneur's being mentioned in the Sellaband Newsletter is included. All
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced
out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
52Table A-16: Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.6432*** 0.3079*** 0.6240*** 0.8609*** 0.7329***
(0.0256) (0.0957) (0.0269) (0.1260) (0.0285)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.7433*** -0.3996*** 0.7682*** 1.0674*** 1.0027***
(0.0322) (0.1320) (0.0334) (0.1602) (0.0349)
$30-40K accum. capital 1.1940*** -0.2021 1.2103*** 1.5558*** 1.5084***
(0.0374) (0.1556) (0.0389) (0.1897) (0.0405)
$40-50K accum. capital 1.7968*** 0.0809 1.8185*** 1.8057*** 2.2355***
(0.0390) (0.1729) (0.0405) (0.2084) (0.0420)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -1.3487*** -2.0564***
(0.1511) (0.0782)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -3.0243*** -3.7040***
(0.1786) (0.0947)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -3.9613*** -4.9193***
(0.2345) (0.1144)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -4.0348*** -6.3398***
(0.2678) (0.1291)
4th to 6th month on Sellaband -0.3783*** -1.3247*** -0.2978*** -1.0737*** -0.2839***
(0.0279) (0.1049) (0.0294) (0.1068) (0.0300)
6th to 12th month on Sellaband -0.4824*** -1.3960*** -0.4169*** -1.0986*** -0.4301***
(0.0372) (0.1533) (0.0390) (0.1599) (0.0399)
12+ months on Sellaband -0.1901*** -1.1235*** -0.1468** -0.6649*** -0.2054***
(0.0588) (0.2402) (0.0614) (0.2507) (0.0623)
Observations 708,745 57,814 650,931 57,814 650,931
Number of group 18,234 1,127 17,107 1,127 17,107
Log Likelihood -85893 -5618 -79645 -5358 -77706
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample. All Logit
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out
using xtlogit command in Stata) and each week. Using dummies instead of the Weeks on Sellaband
variable because of sample size. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
53Table A-17: Positive Parts, xed eects Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.6125*** 0.2056 0.6557*** 0.8511** 0.7768***
(0.0719) (0.2130) (0.0724) (0.3688) (0.0769)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.7437*** 0.1918 0.8329*** 1.1017*** 1.0107***
(0.0972) (0.2654) (0.1020) (0.3380) (0.1053)
$30-40K accum. capital 1.1358*** 0.2115 1.2882*** 1.3225*** 1.5411***
(0.1108) (0.2693) (0.1103) (0.3801) (0.1133)
$40-50K accum. capital 1.9297*** 0.8957*** 2.1000*** 1.9935*** 2.4439***
(0.1096) (0.3299) (0.1161) (0.4508) (0.1168)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -1.4389*** -1.4033***
(0.4415) (0.1593)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -2.1077*** -2.2160***
(0.5066) (0.2359)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -2.9714*** -3.1398***
(0.5841) (0.2974)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -3.0136*** -4.4171***
(0.6693) (0.3431)
4th to 6th month on Sellaband -0.2544*** -0.2450 -0.2350*** -0.1097 -0.2442***
(0.0759) (0.2459) (0.0802) (0.2341) (0.0808)
6th to 12th month on Sellaband -0.3933*** 0.4146 -0.5319*** 0.4868* -0.5739***
(0.1116) (0.3058) (0.1157) (0.2912) (0.1177)
12+ months on Sellaband -0.0492 0.7642** -0.2378 1.0372** -0.3323**
(0.1602) (0.3791) (0.1665) (0.4201) (0.1686)
Observations 708,966 57,820 651,146 57,820 651,146
Number of group 18,322 1,129 17,193 1,129 17,193
Log Likelihood -343532 -36367 -300653 -34846 -293783
Dependent variable is positive parts in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample. All Poisson
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced out)
and each week. Estimated using xtpqml in stata (Simcoe 2007). Using dummies instead of the
Weeks on Sellaband variable because of sample size. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
54Table A-18: Total Parts, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.1216*** 0.2116 0.1173*** 0.5943*** 0.1268***
(0.0176) (0.1710) (0.0170) (0.2115) (0.0172)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.1654*** 0.1290 0.1640*** 0.7685** 0.1787***
(0.0280) (0.2492) (0.0272) (0.3080) (0.0273)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.2575*** 0.1218 0.2621*** 0.7840*** 0.2878***
(0.0353) (0.2733) (0.0344) (0.3000) (0.0349)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.6279*** 0.2909 0.6516*** 1.4283 0.7572***
(0.0560) (0.5770) (0.0534) (0.9797) (0.0568)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.9861*** -0.4108***
(0.2756) (0.0529)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -1.3505*** -0.5489***
(0.2943) (0.0618)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -1.4375*** -0.6860***
(0.2934) (0.0710)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -2.1922*** -1.2360***
(0.7818) (0.0811)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0095*** -0.0162** -0.0092** -0.0112 -0.0086**
(0.0035) (0.0078) (0.0037) (0.0071) (0.0037)
Observations 709,471 57,855 651,616 57,855 651,616
R-squared 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is total parts in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample. Total
parts includes a small number of disinvestments where investors withdraw money from an
entrepreneur. Therefore, the analysis is done with OLS rather than xed eects poisson. All
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced
out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
55Table A-19: Random Eects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Invest =1 LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0297*** 0.0000 0.0307*** 0.0229*** 0.0291***
(0.0011) (0.0067) (0.0011) (0.0080) (0.0011)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0420*** -0.0179** 0.0446*** 0.0281*** 0.0460***
(0.0013) (0.0086) (0.0014) (0.0101) (0.0014)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0677*** -0.0105 0.0712*** 0.0443*** 0.0737***
(0.0017) (0.0095) (0.0017) (0.0126) (0.0017)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.1251*** 0.0200* 0.1306*** 0.0787*** 0.1409***
(0.0023) (0.0115) (0.0023) (0.0159) (0.0024)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0547*** 0.0153***
(0.0086) (0.0031)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0857*** -0.0133***
(0.0090) (0.0025)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1030*** -0.0212***
(0.0117) (0.0028)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1100*** -0.0686***
(0.0150) (0.0041)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.00106*** -0.0015*** -0.00105*** -0.0018*** -0.00105***
(0.00003) (0.0003) (0.00003) (0.0003) (0.00003)
Observations 709,471 57,855 651,616 57,855 651,616
Number of group 18,827 1,164 17,663 1,164 17,663
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(5) and sample is the $50K sample. All
regressions include a full set of random eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair and xed eects
for each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
56Table A-20: Local dened as within 25 km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LOCAL 25 km DISTANT LOCAL 25 km DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital -0.0102 0.0218*** 0.0194* 0.0232***
(0.0089) (0.0012) (0.0108) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital -0.0455*** 0.0283*** 0.0057 0.0327***
(0.0121) (0.0017) (0.0142) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital -0.0430*** 0.0444*** 0.0178 0.0503***
(0.0134) (0.0021) (0.0167) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital -0.0283* 0.0873*** 0.0448** 0.1068***
(0.0156) (0.0027) (0.0206) (0.0028)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0759*** -0.0943***
(0.0139) (0.0062)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1098*** -0.1356***
(0.0148) (0.0066)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1288*** -0.1638***
(0.0173) (0.0069)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1514*** -0.2463***
(0.0216) (0.0074)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0033*** -0.0032*** -0.0029** -0.0031***
(0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0003)
Observations 36,186 673,285 36,186 673,285
R-squared 0.035 0.012 0.043 0.019
Number of group 748 18,079 748 18,079
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(4) and sample is the $50K sample.
All investors within 25 km from the entrepreneurs are here coded as local investors. All
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced
out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
57Table A-21: Local dened as within 100 km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LOCAL 100 km DISTANT LOCAL 100 km DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0082 0.0216*** 0.0340*** 0.0236***
(0.0061) (0.0013) (0.0068) (0.0012)
$20-30K accum. capital -0.0225*** 0.0290*** 0.0307*** 0.0336***
(0.0082) (0.0017) (0.0092) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital -0.0254*** 0.0458*** 0.0379*** 0.0527***
(0.0093) (0.0022) (0.0110) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital -0.0140 0.0902*** 0.0637*** 0.1099***
(0.0110) (0.0028) (0.0137) (0.0029)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0898*** -0.0876***
(0.0102) (0.0066)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1301*** -0.1346***
(0.0111) (0.0073)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1508*** -0.1657***
(0.0127) (0.0076)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1813*** -0.2533***
(0.0154) (0.0082)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0041*** -0.0031*** -0.0035*** -0.0030***
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0003)
Observations 78,897 630,574 78,897 630,574
R-squared 0.039 0.012 0.049 0.018
Number of group 1,572 17,255 1,572 17,255
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(4) and sample is the $50K sample.
All investors within 100 km from the entrepreneurs are here coded as local investors. All
regressions include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair (dierenced
out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the pair level in parentheses. ***







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































59Table A-23: Distant and local in same regression
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Invest=1 Invest=1
$10-20K accum. capital -0.0228*** 0.0045
(0.0059) (0.0073)
$20-30K accum. capital -0.0376*** 0.0119
(0.0064) (0.0087)
$30-40K accum. capital -0.0369*** 0.0230*
(0.0074) (0.0118)
$40-50K accum. capital -0.0276*** 0.0449***
(0.0079) (0.0149)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0791***
(0.0117)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1111***
(0.0125)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1296***
(0.0150)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1476***
(0.0176)
$10-20k accum. capital * Distant 0.0447*** 0.0192***
(0.0059) (0.0074)
$20-30k accum. capital * Distant 0.0653*** 0.0206**
(0.0063) (0.0086)
$30-40k accum. capital * Distant 0.0804*** 0.0269**
(0.0072) (0.0117)
$40-50k accum. capital * Distant 0.1149*** 0.0619***
(0.0077) (0.0149)
$10-20k accum. capital * Distant * F&F -0.0119
(0.0133)
$20-30k accum. capital * Distant * F&F -0.0265*
(0.0143)
$30-40k accum. capital * Distant * F&F -0.0350**
(0.0166)
$40-50k accum. capital * Distant * F&F -0.1043***
(0.0193)




Number of group 18,827 18,827
Dependent variable is any investment in columns (1)-(2) and
sample is the $50K sample. Distant and local are presented
here in same regression (i.e. interaction term). All regressions
include a full set of xed eects for each entrepreneur-investor pair
(dierenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered
at the pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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